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 This report delves into the events that occurred on August 21st 1968 in 
Czechoslovakia and October 2nd 1968 in Mexico. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the 
Soviet Union and the massacre at Tlatelolco are two crucibles that remain a significant 
factor in the mindset of people from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Mexico today. In 
my writing I draw parallelisms between these two events, that occurred mere months 
from each other, on different continents and had students asking one common thing from 
their respective governments, they wanted to be heard. The invasion of Czechoslovakia 
came as a surprise; the country’s new leader Alexander Dubcek was relaxing the 
government’s stronghold on the media and freedom of press was slowly becoming a 
reality. These advances did not sit well with Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Politburo so 
they made a rash decision to invade; the Soviets believed that losing their stronghold in 
Czechoslovakia would lead to their demise in other Eastern European countries. 1968 
was also a turbulent year in Mexico, the country was poised to host the Summer 
Olympics and it would be the first time a Latin American country would hold that honor 
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so the pressure was enormous. By 1968 the PRI party held a tight reign on Mexico’s 
government and the students wanted change, they felt social injustice was on the rise and 
they felt compelled to speak up. Unfortunately the government was not ready to negotiate 
and ten days before the inauguration of the Olympics the army marched in on a peaceful 
student protest and opened fire.  
 Both movements were squashed but they mark the beginning of the end of one 
party rule in Czechoslovakia and Mexico. The conclusion of the report reaches 1988 
when the Velvet Revolution took off in Czechoslovakia and Mexico’s presidential 
election had to be rigged in order for the PRI to win. After the Velvet Revolution 
Czechoslovakia eased into democratic elections and it continues to be a full democracy 
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It is not often that Czechoslovakia and Mexico are mentioned within the same 
context much less the same sentence. In my mind Czechoslovakia is a far off country that 
ceased to exist a few years after I was born, while Mexico is one of my home countries, 
the country of my culture and heritage. As of late I have had a bigger interest in exploring 
the History of Mexico and Eastern European History has been a great interest of mine 
since I was a teenager. For my final report I knew I wanted to focus on events that I 
believe tie my two interests together. I believe Mexico and Russia today share many 
similar characteristics, from their comparable present day population to their long lasting 
one party governments. The first time I visited Moscow in 2012 I remember thinking 
how similar it felt to being in Mexico City. As we drove in from Domodedovo Airport 
the scenery was similar to the drive in to Mexico City from the Benito Juarez Airport, we 
passed houses of varying levels of socioeconomic development and the presence of 
globalization was felt with each passing advertisement for foreign brands.  
During the twentieth century both Russia and Mexico were submitted to 
authoritarian rule under a one party system, in Mexico, the PRI party came to power after 
the end of the Revolution and remained in power until the year 2000. While in Russia, a 
form of communism headed by Vladimir Lenin swept the nation after the Civil War. The 
Soviet Union was established and it would remain under a totalitarian regime, masked in 
a communist façade, until its dissolution in 1991. During its reign the Soviet Union had 
many satellite states, amongst them, Czechoslovakia, and the plight of the Czechoslovaks 
to reach their independence resonates as a parallelism with Mexicans wanting 
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independence from their own government. Both countries were searching for the same 
thing in 1968, democracy.  
 Being Mexican American and having a deeply rooted interest in Russian and 
Mexican history and culture, it is important for me to bring a better understanding of two 
outstanding moments in history, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Tlatelolco 
massacre in Mexico by building a comparison of both events, crucibles to each nation, 
which even though they occurred thousands of miles apart, brought similar repercussions. 
As Elena Poniatowska so poignantly puts it, “In many ways the political, social and 
moral crisis that ensued has not yet been resolved”.  I hope to achieve a fair comparative 
analysis of both of these world events, with the hope of not only gaining a better 
understanding of the events themselves but also providing a clear narrative of what the 
situation was like in both Mexico and Czechoslovakia in 1968.  
The year 1968 was a year that witnessed much controversy as student movements 
were taking off in many countries. The sixties are commonly known as an era where the 
Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union overshadowed most of the news, and 
sometimes this resulted in an exclusion of news stories starring other countries and 
relating to the student movements around the world. Being so close to the US is partially 
responsible for Mexico being overlooked on a worldwide scale yet with a population that 
rivals the present Russian population, and a history rooted with intrigue and corruption, 
the Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico serves as a good comparison to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia headed by the Soviet Union, during the year 1968. The students in 
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Mexico were well aware of developments in places such as: France, Cuba, the US and 
Czechoslovakia. Like their counterparts around the world, Mexican students felt it was 
time for a rebellion and they did not want to be left behind. The students’ ideology and 
methods were borrowed from other movements, students in Mexico began to engage in 
peaceful marches, handed out fliers, held meetings and would oftentimes resort to 
throwing sticks and rocks at police to show their discontent (Witherspoon).   
Both countries in my research share similarities that make their study relevant to 
our understanding of parallel social movements in the context of authoritarian regimes. It 
is important to mention the fact that both regimes had not been properly legitimated 
within the general population. In particular, both regimes espoused a unity myth that may 
not have been properly internalized and accepted by the population. In Mexico, the 
population saw the idea of miscegenation as a uniting force for all Mexicans as a myth, in 
particular among the educated urban middle class. In Czechoslovakia, ethnic divisions 
between Czechs and Slovaks were dismissed as being a procommunist construction, but 
the population still felt them in their everyday lives. 
The multiple rebellions that took place throughout the world in 1968 had one 
striking commonality, they were not planned, it seemed as if people around the world had 
just snapped. People in communist countries were rebelling against communism, while 
people in capitalist countries were rebelling against capitalism. It was students who were 
leading many of these rebellions and because of their sense of urgency and disarray, 
rebellions were directed through hastily called meetings and newly minted protest groups. 
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How else were anti-authoritarian groups supposed to work? Their ideology clearly 
opposed leaders, which resulted in unclear ideologies and widespread disagreement on 
many issues (Kurlansky).  
For the most part, I wish to keep my narrative aligned to the events that occurred 
in Prague and Mexico City in 1968, although I will mention the events occurring in the 
US at that time in order to give a broader perspective of student movements. The 
American War in Vietnam was unlike other wars; it was not supposed to be unique, yet it 
was. It was unique in the sense that it was an ideological proxy war fought by what was 
deemed the first ever global super power, the US. It was also the first war to be televised, 
meaning people around the world were privy, firsthand to the atrocities of war, this in 
turn helped pave the way for student movements in the US. The year 1968 was a 
particularly deadly one in the Vietnam War, as Kurlansky illustrates, the US military was 
killing the same number of people or more as died during the September 11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center. Back on US soil, the civil rights movement was taking off, with 
people uniting not only for equal rights among races but also uniting in vehement 
opposition of the Vietnam War. The fact that it was the first televised war also 
contributed to a globalized world in which student movements could more easily relate to 
each other. The Black Power movement was also gaining traction throughout the US and 
taking shape as a violent movement, people in the US were preparing for a war of races. 
Primordially a war between the police and Black Power advocates. Meanwhile Cold War 
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tensions were escalating and the future was unclear not only for the US and the Soviet 
Union but also for the rest of the world (Kurlansky). 
Some of the questions that arose about Mexico were: Was the 1968 student 
movement in Mexico politically charged? Or was it mainly a way of seeking democratic 
vindication? Was there any involvement from Mexico’s strong leftist group? What was 
its true meaning and what was there, really, behind the conflict? Ever since the founding 
of Mexico as an independent country in 1821 there have been political tensions. There 
has never existed a true democratic government in Mexico and by 1968 tensions were at 
a boiling point. Since the start of the PRI party’s reign, voting for president was a 
formality, the next president would be the hand picked successor of the president in 
power (Lombardo Toledano). During the election of 1964 nothing seemed to be different, 
President Adolfo Lopez Mateos had set his sights on the Secretary of Government, 
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz as his successor. Protests arose in 1968 in large part as a reaction to 
police brutality but that quickly transformed and escalated into demands for expansion of 
the democracy, university reform, and efforts to ease poverty (Witherspoon). Meanwhile 
students in Czechoslovakia were joyous about the political liberalization brought about 
by Alexander Dubcek and his reforms in 1968. Moscow, at that time headed by Leonid 
Brezhnev was not joyous and put a stop to Dubcek by invading Czechoslovakia angering 
many Czechoslovaks. Czechoslovaks then took it upon themselves to express their 





By 1968 students demonstrating on college campuses had become a widespread 
occurrence, in the US alone approximately thirty schools a month were erupting in some 
form of chaos. Protestors quickly understood that in order to be taken seriously they 
could not simply wield signs and host sit-ins they needed more drastic measures. Students 
across the world showed their discontent with their administrations, war and other things 
they deemed unfair by taking over buildings, refusing to attend class or other drastic acts 
like the students of the University of Wisconsin in Madison who planted 400 white 
crosses on the lawn of Bascom Hill near the administration building. They put up a sign 
that read “Bascom Memorial Cemetery, Class of 1968” the protestors explained that they 
thought the campus ought to look like a graveyard, because that is where most of the 
seniors were headed. The students that were out protesting in 1968 had been born after 
World War II, so their thoughts on war vastly differed from that of older generations. 
Growing up during the Cold War had the same effect on most of the children around the 
world; it caused them to fear both blocs. Distrust of both factions of the Cold War by 
youths was at an all time high. Students arriving at college campuses during the mid 
1960’s had a deep resentment and distrust of any kind of authority. Since authority 
figures were not to be trusted, most student movements had no absolute leader, the 
moment someone dared declare themself a leader was the moment they were no longer to 
be trusted, this led to disorganization. Another noteworthy difference between the 
generation of the 1960’s and its predecessor is television. This generation was the first to 
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grow up with television and they innately understood it in a way the older generation 
never would. Television became an important platform for the student movements, it 
gave them worldwide visibility and also helped build a feeling of community whilst 
fighting against oppressors, much like the way social media unites youth around the 
world today (Kurlansky). 
The Soviet invasion of the independent Czechoslovakia was condemned around 
the world, yet condemnation did not lead to action and soon after the invasion the 
Czecholovaks found themselves, once again, under a hard lined communist regime. A 
little over a month after the events in Czechoslovakia the student movement reached a 
breaking point in Mexico City when thousands lined the streets in protest of Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz’s presidency, police brutality, inequality and Mexico’s hosting of the 1968 
Olympic Games. The massacre at Tlatelolco was not as widely reported on because the 
Mexican government did everything to keep the story from undermining Mexico’s ability 
to host the Olympics. The students’ movements in both Czechoslovakia and Mexico were 
squashed within a matter of days but their legacy remains.  
 In Mexico, the year 1968 culminated with Mexico City hosting the Olympic 
games in the shadows of violent student protests in opposition to the government. I look 
to analyze and to offer a comparison of two countries at a time when they were both 
struggling with an unhappy population and a stagnate government. In 1968 both the 
Soviet Union and Mexico were looking to finally cement their places in the world. The 
Soviet Union had gotten off to a rocky start, with the death of their beloved leader, Lenin 
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coming merely three years after the consolidation of power by the Red Army after a long 
and bloody civil war. Afterwards, a power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin ended 
with a ruthless totalitarian regime headed by Stalin, who viciously killed millions of 
Soviet citizens during his twenty-three year reign. By 1968 Leonid Brezhnev was head of 
a stagnate Soviet Union with a crumbling economy and a growing anti Soviet sentiment 
within the Soviet Union and in many of its satellite states, especially Czechoslovakia.  
 Meanwhile, Mexico had also suffered through a long and bloody Civil War that 
ended with the PRI party taking control and keeping a totalitarian regime for seventy 
years. Currently the PRI party is back in office after a twelve-year hiatus but during 1968 
it seemed as though its reign would never be interrupted much like it was felt that the 
Soviet Union would never cease to exist. It was of utmost importance to the Mexican 
government that the Olympic games of 1968 go off without a hitch. The 1968 Olympics 
were a tapestry of national and international politics, racial tensions, intriguing 
personalities and athletic achievement. It is also important to remember that the Mexico 
Olympics were the first to deal with issues such as drug testing and the threat of terrorism 
(Witherspoon).  
Olympics  
It was in October of 1963 that it was announced that Mexico had won the bid for 
the 1968 Olympics. Nations look upon a winning Olympic bid as winning a prize but it is 
a prize that comes with unparalleled international scrutiny, especially when you are the 
first Latin American country to be chosen, the first developing country, the first “third 
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world” country. Mexican government officials had managed to convince the Olympic 
committee and the world that Mexico was stable enough and prosperous enough to host 
the Olympics, now they had a little over four years to prepare and prove their point. 
Mexico in the 1960’s portrayed itself as a seemingly stable nation, especially in 
comparison to other Latin American countries. In many respects this was a false sense of 
stability, characterized by a seemingly peaceful transfer of power from one president to 
the next. However, the stability of political succession came at the price of true 
democracy. At that time Mexico was holding presidential elections every six years, as it 
still does today, however back then there was one ruling party, the PRI. The PRI’s 
candidates had been elected without opposition since the end of the Revolution in the 
1920’s. While the six-year elections gave the image of a true democracy, participation of 
the masses was extremely limited and most Mexicans were living in discontent, 
something that is still true today. Despite heavy internal discontent, the Mexican 
government strongly endorsed an Olympic bid, much like the present-day Brazil 
administration, which took it upon themselves to host an Olympic Games despite strong 
opposition from the populace and a president on the verge of impeachment. Mexico’s 
hopes for a peaceful Olympiad were dashed by the summer of 1968 when the student 
movement became stronger than ever (Witherspoon).  
 At first Mexicans openly celebrated their triumph of hosting the Olympics but 
their euphoria was short lived. During the years leading up to the Games there was an 
uncertainty that permeated Mexico. The country became increasingly wracked by 
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political controversy relating to one central question, was it realistic for a developing 
nation to host a successful Olympics? It would be easy to assume that the president of 
Mexico at the time Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was a fierce supporter of the Games however the 
opposite was actually true. Since Mexico’s presidents are elected on a six-year term, with 
no option to reelect, Diaz Ordaz felt slighted into the Games by the previous 
administration. Former president Adolfo Lopez Mateos had been obsessed with Mexico’s 
Olympic bid and successfully angled to become Chairman of the Mexican Organizing 
Committee shortly after he finished his term as president. Lopez Mateos saw Japan’s 
massive investment in the 1964 Tokyo Games as a model for Mexico, however it was 
popular opinion that Mexico was not in a condition to buy prestige at such a price. So, 
even though Diaz Ordaz saw the Games as a cross to bear, he knew that under no 
circumstances should Mexico bow out of its hosting duties and thus give reason to all of 
its critics (Zolov). 
 For many years the image of Mexico that permeated abroad has not been an 
accurate one. Even today Mexico finds it hard to shake the poncho wearing, donkey-
riding stigma that seems intrinsically tied with Mexican culture, especially since Donald 
Trump came to the forefront of US politics in 2016.  One of Mexico’s main interests after 
being selected to host the 1968 Summer Olympic Games was to shape the perception the 
outside world had of Mexico and Mexican culture. This is somewhat ironic since the 
Mexican Olympic delegation had helped secure Mexico’s bid to host the Olympics by 
showcasing a folkloric image of the country, an image that included sombreros and 
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ponchos. Mexico faced an uphill battle in convincing the Olympic Committee that it was 
time for a developing, Latin American nation to act as host. Mexico used its rich pre-
Columbian history mixed with contemporary classics such as, Mariachis to paint a 
picture of the warmth and charm that exudes from all Mexican people (Castillo). 
As the 1968 Olympic games drew closer there started to be a noticeable 
international campaign to prevent the games from occurring in Mexico. Many people 
were convinced that the games would be a huge disaster since it was the first time a 
developing country in Latin America would be the host. Many critics used the 1968 
Student Movement and the consequent massacre as a reason for the failure of the games. 
European countries argued that the student movement could give way to another Mexican 
revolution. The image of Mexico that surged from the European mindset was of an 
underdeveloped country with traces of irresponsibility and lack of culture exuding from 
its citizens. Mexico did not deserve to be trusted with such an important event as was the 
Olympics; Mexico could not handle such pressure. Mexico was a country that severely 
lagged behind the US and Western Europe, at least in their eyes, and sadly it continues to 
be seen as that country today (Witherspoon).  
 Mexico’s perceived “underdevelopment” was an inseparable discursive 
component to perceptions of Mexico abroad. It rested upon Mexico’s shoulders to fulfill 
the expectation that a third world country could advance along the spectrum of 
democratic, capitalist development. Mexico carried a heavy burden of representation into 
the 1968 Olympics and it became an explicit and intrinsic aspect in terms of planning for 
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the Games. What was to have been Mexico’s golden opportunity to showcase its 
newfound modernity was instead threatening to divide the country and embarrass 
Mexico’s government. Two years after having won the Olympic bid there were very few 
signs of advancement in terms of building and planning, it seemed possible that Diaz 
Ordaz would quit at any moment. Mexico faced not only the pressing reality of financial 
restraints but also the more abstract problem of credibility. Mexico had no time for 
internal squabbles and constantly denied any internal trouble to the world but the 
question of expenditure and government priorities became a rallying point for the student 
movement (Zolov).  
 Mexico’s official logo for the games was a simple “MEXICO68” and it was clear 
that its design was meant to have a modernist feel with its sleek and subtle elegance. 
Along with the cool logo came dozens of “edecanes” (event hostesses) who proudly wore 
the logo on their miniskirts and pantsuits, from afar it was evident that Mexico was on the 
verge of something spectacular. Mexico was actually the first host country to give a 
greater emphasis on culture and bring that onto the Games as an integral aspect. The 
iconic use of the peace dove made reference to Mexico’s self- described role as an 
international “peacemaker” and the arrival of the Olympic flame at the pre-Hispanic site 
of Teotihuacan helped accentuate Mexico’s cultural authenticity. Sadly, today most of the 
memories left over from those Olympic games are generally associated to the tragedy at 
Tlatelolco or to the image of the silent protest led by certain black athletes from the US 
who stood with their fists up in the air as a show of defiance for the unequal treatment of 
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blacks in the US. The historical memory of the games tends to leave out the conflicts and 
challenges that marked Mexico’s staging of the games. The reputation of Mexico as a 
whole was on the line with a successful Olympic games and when the time came to shine, 
Mexico faltered (Zolov). 
 The years leading up to the Tlatelolco massacre and the Olympics had been 
focused on giving Mexico credibility as a peaceful and modern country, the official motto 
of the 1968 Olympics said it all, “Todo es possible en la paz” (Everything is possible in 
peace). The student movement was proving to be disastrous to Mexican credibility and 
the government was not about to let all of its hard work over the past few years come 
stumbling down because a few hundred students were protesting. However, it is 
important to note that the students did not aim to sabotage the Games, in reality many 
youths and intellectuals who sympathized with the student movement had participatory 
roles throughout the Games, specifically in the cultural aspect of the Games. The protests 
were aimed at President Diaz Ordaz as a critique of the authoritarian nature of Mexican 
society rather than as an attack on the Games themselves (Zolov). However, due to the 
force with which the government squashed the student movement mere days before the 
opening ceremony the Games became intrinsically tied to the Tlatelolco Massacre. 
 Today the number of deaths that occurred in the Tlatelolco Massacre is still 
unclear, however the historical significance of the 1968 student movement is gaining 
interest from researchers. There is much memory from this time but little objective 
historical analysis, as new archival sources become available there will hopefully be a 
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shift towards a growing appreciation for the centrality of the XIX Olympiad. To better 
understand the culmination of the massacre at Tlatelolco it seems necessary to understand 
the Mexican mindset at that time. Did planning for the Olympics generate widespread 
support in Mexico? The general assumption, because of the students’ unrest would be 
that, no, the games were strongly unsupported. Yet, as Zolov points out in his article, “the 
question of public support, remains one of the crucial and least understood aspects of this 
period; it strikes at the heart of the deeper problematic concerning the nature of the ruling 
PRI party’s hegemony during the Mexican Miracle.”   
 Mexico has never really had a president that was deemed handsome, the closest 
one has been current president Enrique Pena Nieto but his constant stumbles outshine all 
of his physical features. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was elected as president of Mexico in 1964 
and contrary to Pena Nieto was an extremely ugly man, one of his more prominent 
nicknames was “el chango” which translates to “the monkey”. One thing that Diaz Ordaz 
had in his favor was his powerful oratory skills. Diaz Ordaz was facing a tough year in 
1968 and he knew it, he would have to rely on his oratory skills to get Mexico through 
the Olympics without disruption. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Mexico had 
been embroiled in a bloody revolutionary war until a system of government was 
established whose primary goal was not democracy but stability, Mexico has yet to obtain 
a truly democratic government. The fact that Mexico had a revolving door of presidents 
during the 1920’s helped to cement the country’s current six year presidential terms 
without an option for reelection. For six years the president of Mexico basically had 
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almost absolute power, without fear of retribution since no reelection was possible and it 
was a one party system, there was no fear of losing an election. The power the president 
of Mexico was given was only limited to three things he could not do: secede any 
territory to a foreign power, confiscate land from indigenous people and succeed himself 
as president (Kurlansky). By the time Diaz Ordaz came to power this system had been 
around for over thirty years, so it was a smooth transition, the people of Mexico had 
gotten used to the authoritarian system, or better yet they had only ever been privy to an 
authoritarian system.  
 One major difference between the PRI and other political systems that had been 
present in Mexico before was that the PRI was not primarily violent; it would not resort 
to killing unless all other options had been exhausted.  Diaz Ordaz was chosen as the next 
president by the PRI leadership after having served as minister of the interior and he was 
ready to put Mexico on display at a worldwide level. During the 1960’s Mexico had been 
experiencing strong economic expansion and its political and financial stability had 
garnered it international praise as a leading Latin American country. Diaz Ordaz was 
eager to showcase how far Mexico had come since its bloody Revolution and the 
Olympics would be the perfect time to introduce the new and improved Mexico to the 
world. Mexico was counting on the Olympics to show the world that Mexico had become 
an emerging and successful modern country with an emerging middle class and a capital 
city that exuded beauty and efficiency. The Games were to be completely televised and it 
was to be Mexico’s first big international event, nothing could go wrong (Kurlansky).  
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 By mid 1968 it was evident that controversy was showing its face in every 
country and Diaz Ordaz became worried about any demonstrations during the Games. At 
first a main concern had been a possible boycott from black athletes from the US, where 
race conflicts were at an all time high after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. 
The boycott idea gained steamed after the International Olympic Committee decided to 
readmit the apartheid team of South Africa. Mexicans sensed disaster from this decision 
and convinced the Olympic Committee to once again instill a ban on South Africa, crisis 
averted (Kurlansky). While Mexico was concerned with the world beyond their borders, 
it did not dawn on the government that social unrest in their own country was increasing. 
Social unrest in Mexico was increasing in large part due to the unfair distribution of 
wealth. Kurlansky notes that by 1960 about 78 percent of disposable income in Mexico 
was going to only the upper 10 percent of Mexican society. This study, done by Ifgenia 
Martinez was the first of its kind in Mexico and it proved to be an explanation as to why 
many people were unhappy in a rapidly developing country. For the most part the PRI 
was good at suppressing any opposition and by 1968 it had managed to successfully 
suppress many peasant movements, a teachers union protest, and a railroad workers 
strike. There was really only one group that the PRI did not have under its control in 
1968, the students (Kurlansky). 
 The students of both Mexico City and Prague in 1968 shared many similarities, 
mainly the fact that they were born after both the Mexican Revolution and World War II 
and in their minds their governments were not saviors but oppressors. The main 
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difference was that Mexico’s fight was against its own government while the 
Czechoslovaks fought to free their country from the iron grip that the Soviet Union had 
held on it since liberating it from Germany in World War II. By 1968 Mexico was fast on 
its way to becoming the largest city in the world, its population was increasing at about 3 
percent per year and a very large sector of Mexico’s population was young and Mexico 
had more students in its realm than ever before. For the most part these students were 
well aware that they were privy to a better life than their parents, not only in the 
economical sense but also in the sense that they felt freer to express themselves and 
openly talk about their societal qualms. The students of Mexico were well aware that 
their country’s growing economy did not benefit many of the people around them. One 
Mexican student, Roberto Escudero described the generational gap the following way, 
“There was a big difference between our generation and our parents’. They were very 
traditional. They had received benefits from the Mexican Revolution, and Zapata and 
others from the revolution were their heroes. We had those heroes, too, but we also had 
Che and Fidel. We saw the PRI more as authoritarian, where they saw it as a 
revolutionary liberator” (Kurlansky). 
 Compared with the US and Europe, the Mexican student movement was 
minuscule but even so it became an important concern for the government in 1968 mainly 
because of the Olympics and Diaz Ordaz not wanting anything to tarnish Mexico’s 
reputation leading up to the Games. Diaz Ordaz was filled with paranoia and kept close 
tabs on the student movements evolving in Mexico, the Ministry of Interior led by Luis 
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Echeverria had many informants, at least one informant reporting from every student 
organization. Not much valuable information was obtained from these informants but one 
thing that did fuel Diaz Ordaz’s paranoia was the fact that it was repeatedly noted in 
Interior Ministry files that student meetings and writings often ended with, “Viva los 
movimientos estudiantiles de todo el mundo!” (Long live the student movements around 
the world). Diaz Ordaz and his government were convinced that it was outside forces that 
were in danger of coming into Mexico and destabilizing it, and students were the most at 
risk of falling prey to these outside forces (Kurlansky). 
 Strangely enough, Mexico was one of the few countries that did not condemn the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. By that point Mexico was too concerned with its 
internal issues to focus on external issues. By July 1968 the small and splintered student 
movement in Mexico had gained traction and on July 22nd the students were swarmed by 
police as they demonstrated on a street. As the students retreated the police pursued them 
throughout the neighborhood and would beat anyone they caught, this rampage went on 
for three hours, twenty students were arrested and the cause remains, to this day, 
unknown. This rampage gave the student movement validity and a cause that resonated 
with the Mexican public, police brutality (Kurlansky).  
 There is an eerie comparison to be drawn between the Communist Party and the 
PRI party that ruled Mexico during the twentieth century. If any Mexican wanted to 
change things, improve things or make life better in general they needed to join the PRI. 
In Mexico like the Soviet Union only members of the ruling political party could be 
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deemed true players. Whenever an opposing person or group rose to some popularity in 
Mexico the leader would have to be either bought out or killed, this applied equally to 
labor organizers and journalists (Kurlansky). I feel it is no coincidence that today both 
Russia and Mexico rank among the most dangerous countries for journalists.  
It is unclear what the Mexican students were searching for; certainly it was not 
violence, which is what resulted. I believe, the students wanted to be heard, they wanted 
to at least create a dialogue with the government, however the government was not 
looking for a dialogue and with the student movement gaining traction mere days before 
the opening ceremony of the Olympics, Diaz Ordaz decided to violently crush the student 
movement.  
The Events in Mexico 
 Elena Poniatowska’s book Massacre in Mexico walks us through the days leading 
up to the October 2nd massacre in Mexico and makes readers privy to the general mood of 
hopefulness and enthusiasm at seeking a public dialogue with those in power. Mexico 
was not a communist or socialist country however it had remained stagnate ever since the 
PRI took office following the Revolution. Many were certain that the middle-class 
Student Movement would be followed by worker and peasant movements that would 
eventually get through to the government, sadly this did not occur. The students’ efforts 
crashed and burned that October 2nd and to this day the events of that fateful day remain 
blurry and censored to the Mexican people. If the Mexican government ever wishes to 
reclaim the people’s trust, it needs to own its part in the massacre (Poniatowska).  
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 One of the main problems that arose after the 1968 student movement was the 
Mexican government’s inability to acknowledge what was happening. For the Mexican 
government mere acceptance of the Student Movement along with the obvious discontent 
of many of its citizens would have amounted to the government’s self betrayal. Like the 
Soviet system the Mexican political system was founded on the belief that the president 
and official government party, at that time the PRI, were the incarnation of the whole 
country, much like the Soviet party was supposed to encompass all Soviet citizens. Much 
like Russia, Mexico has never been a true democracy, shifting from Spanish rule to a 
short-lived empire, first under Agustin de Iturbide then Maximilian of Habsburg up until 
the self-styled dictator Porfirio Diaz. Mexico has constantly been trying to free itself from 
the grasp of authoritarian parties and leaders without much success (Poniatowska). 
 The movement that culminated with the march to the Plaza de las Tres Culturas 
on October 2nd, 1968 did not have a defined ideology. It was a movement geared by 
students, mainly middle class and intellectual groups who had become dissatisfied with 
the government and its role in benefitting only a small minority in the forty years since 
the end of the Revolutionary War (Poniatowska). The Plaza de las Tres Culturas sits in 
the Tlatelolco district of Mexico City, it represents all three of the major eras in Mexican 
history. Legend has it, that it was at this site where the Aztecs formed their final 
resistance against the Spanish conquistadores led by Hernan Cortes. There lay Aztec 
ruins, partially excavated and nearby was a Spanish cathedral and surrounding everything 
was a slew of modern era apartment buildings. There, across the ruins of their Aztec 
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ancestors, the students gathered on that fateful afternoon to peacefully protest the harsh 
treatment of students by the government. The atmosphere was pleasant and enthusiastic 
cheers were heard throughout the night. Their families joined the students and many 
children were running about, the police presence that surrounded them was little cause for 
concern. At about 6:20 p.m. army troops moved in and sealed off all exits from the 
square, suddenly a military group known as the Olimpia Battalion opened fire on the 
crowd from balconies that lined the square. The crowd was trapped; there was nowhere to 
run. A reckless stampede ensued, crushing people to their deaths. From every side the 
students met death; gunfire came from bayonets, helicopters and tanks. It went on until 
eleven o’clock that night. The only refuge to be found was in the nearby apartments 
where students fled with people that took them in. Soldiers saturated the buildings with 
bullets and grenades, blowing out windows and wounding many people inside. The 
troops then stormed the apartment buildings, arresting anyone who looked like a student 
and anyone they suspected of trying to help them. The arrested students were beaten and 
groped as they were pushed towards awaiting police trucks (Witherspoon). 
 The number of people that died that night remains a mystery to this day. Rumors 
persist that the government cremated many bodies to prevent the true extent of the 
slaughter to be known. A fact the government has vehemently denied. The official 
number of deaths was thirty-eight, including four soldiers. However, it is thought that the 
actual number is around 300 dead. Several thousand-student leaders were taken into 
custody and were tortured. Years would pass before students considered public protest 
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again; the emotional scars that many carried made it especially hard to participate in any 
protests after that night. Mexico’s grievous flaws came to light, shattering its myth of 
peace and stability while the world was watching; ironically an unofficial motto of the 68 
Olympics was “Before the Eyes of the World” (Witherspoon).  
 The student movements in both Mexico and Czechoslovakia were unique in that 
students provided an ideal source of protestors. As Witherspoon states “Students are 
generally not of the lowest financial class, so they have the means and wherewithal to 
support a movement. They are educated and literate and also more politically aware than 
other groups.” The parallelisms that exist between the movements in Mexico and 
Czechoslovakia are routed in the students because both groups were seeking to establish 
their own identity by breaking with societal norms. What unites Mexican students and 
Czechoslovak students and differentiates them from other student movements such as 
France and the US is the self-absorbed notion with which Mexicans and Czechoslovaks 
viewed their own nations (Witherspoon). Change was supposed to start with them, they 
felt it and more importantly, they believed it.  
 What is noteworthy is the connection some journalists in Mexico made between 
the Mexican student movement and the Communist Party. This connection was made on 
the basis that the students’ request for the release of political prisoners indicated that 
communists had infiltrated the student movement. However, members of the Communist 
Youth who advocated for a more militant movement complained that the Communist 
Party did not play a more prominent role in the student movement helping to disprove the 
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journalists’ theory. Mexican and Czechoslovak students were not calling for a revolution 
and they did not call for a significant overhaul of the political system and both 
movements could have been defused at an early juncture without the use of violence 
(Witherspoon).  
Prague Spring 
 The feeling in Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1968 was one of hope; in 
February the Czechoslovakian hockey team had just become victorious over the 
previously undefeated Soviet team at the Winter Olympics in France. In Prague there was 
a feeling of optimism as new clubs opened and young men with long hair and women in 
miniskirts danced to American music playing from the jukebox. Sure, it took a few 
demonstrations to get the clubs open but it was worth it and for the most part non violent. 
While the media was still controlled by the government in Czechoslovakia, the 
government was actually using the press to promote the idea of a communist democracy. 
Alexander Dubcek is known for coining the term “socialism with a human face” and 
trying to gain the upper hand in a battle of wit with the Soviet Union. Dubcek came to 
power in Czechoslovakia after the ousting of Antonin Novotny, Dubcek was a likeable 
communist with a simple and eloquent message, he said “Democracy is not only the right 
and chance to pronounce one’s own views, but also the way in which people’s views are 
handled, whether they have a real feeling of co-responsibility, co-decision, whether they 
really feel they are participating in making decisions and solving important problems.” 
People inside and outside of Czechoslovakia took him at his word, The New York times 
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even named Prague “the right place to be” that summer for people under thirty 
(Kurlansky). 
Dubcek’s Rise 
Alexander Dubcek was known as a reformer and wanted Czechoslovakia to 
advance toward political liberalism. Dubcek made his move in 1967 when the 
Czechoslovak economy was in decline and people were growing discontent with 
Novotny’s hard line government and policies. In 1967 Dubcek made a secret invitation to 
Brezhnev, he wanted Brezhnev to see firsthand the opposition that had formed against 
Novotny. Dubcek’s plan worked and by January of 1968 he had taken over the role of 
First Secretary of Czechoslovakia. A short time after, Antonin Novotny was ousted as 
president but Dubcek did not have a free hand in naming his replacement. The new 
president must be someone who could not only work along with Dubcek but also please 
Brezhnev and his Kremlin cronies. Dubcek ended up picking an unpopular president in 
Ludovik Svoboda, a seventy-two year old war hero who had fought along with the 
Soviets in World War II and was a retired general. The students were not very pleased 
with Dubcek’s pick and they let him know it by demonstrating in front of the Communist 
Party headquarters. Dubcek thought nothing of this protest and calmly told the students 
why he had chosen Svoboda and assured them that their newfound liberties would not be 
abolished. Dubcek let it be known to the students that they themselves were the guarantee 
that the old days would not be back. The students took Dubcek at his word, they thought 
it was possible to achieve democracy within the Soviet bloc (Kurlansky). Dubcek thought 
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he had a good understanding of the Soviet Union, however he could only guess at the 
inner workings of Brezhnev’s government and Brezhnev’s mind. Dubcek incorrectly 
assumed that he would be given free reign in Czechoslovakia as long as the country 
remained a faithful member of the Soviet bloc, his idealist reforms were ahead of his 
time.  
By August 1968 it seemed that Brezhnev had reached a modus vivendi with 
Dubcek’s leadership and observers of Soviet politics interpreted this as a victory for the 
Czechoslovak reformers. However days later the Soviets would march into 
Czechoslovakia while the world looked on incredulously, both the US and NATO had 
considered a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to be highly unlikely. The decision to 
invade Czechoslovakia did not result from a single Soviet actor, instead such actions 
were a process of political interaction among the senior decision makers in the Soviet 
Politiburo and the heads of several bureaucratic elites at the Central Committee level. 
Personal interests, varying backgrounds, and previous political career experience 
provided good clues as to why certain decisions were made. Initially the political crisis in 
Czechoslovakia seemed to be only a power struggle for a more pluralistic concept of 
socialism conceived by Dubcek. If we look at it in terms of the Soviet point of view, the 
revival of freedom of the press in Czechoslovakia created a dangerous political situation 
which could potentially impact neighboring Eastern European countries and the Soviet 
Union itself (Valenta). 
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The Prague Spring was a different kind of revolt, it did not challenge the basic 
elements of Soviet national security interests and it did not proclaim that its brand of 
socialism would signify the loss of control by the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the 
Soviets saw any shift in ideas as problematic and a potential dangerous threat to their 
authoritarianism. Senior Soviet decision makers must have been disturbed by 
Czechoslovak reformism and deemed that the situation in Czechoslovakia had to be 
stabilized and this was to be achieved by the use of military force. At first there was hope 
that the military build up might serve as an instrument of psychological pressure against 
the Czechoslovaks. The actual decision to invade came until late August after a long 
process of pulling and hauling by major party officials. The ultimate decision came after 
it was agreed that the “deviant” ideas of reformism and federalism could spill over from 
Czechoslovakia into other communist nations. There did however exist a 
noninterventionist faction within the Soviet Union who felt that intervention would prove 
detrimental to ongoing foreign policy strategies and Brezhnev vacillated between both 
interventionist and noninterventionist factions in an attempt to identify with the 
prevailing one while alternating his stance several times. In the Soviet Union the prime-
motivating factor behind backing a coalition was not necessarily ideological 
considerations but rather calculations of expected payoffs, or calculations of 
compatibility and conflicts of interest (Valenta). 
Brezhnev ultimately backed the interventionist coalition whose aim was the 
removal of Dubcek and his supporters by military force. The payoff that came with this 
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policy was as the removal of reformism in Czechoslovakia. We may never truly know 
what specifically made Brezhnev make up his mind to back military intervention but we 
can speculate. The collection and processing of information may have had an important 
role here since during the Novotny era, Soviet leaders received somewhat accurate 
information from Czechoslovakia however with the personnel changes made under 
Dubcek the information channels were lost. The loss of information was a big motivating 
factor for the military intervention. There is evidence that points to the Politiburo’s final 
decision to invade being based on information and estimates provided by KGB 
informants. Meanwhile the US was wrapped up in Vietnam, presidential elections and the 
civil rights movement, which led to them being either unable or unwilling to intervene on 
behalf of Czechoslovakia. In July of 1968 strict orders were given by the Johnson 
administration in regards to the behavior of the US armed forces in West Germany. US 
forces were forbidden from conducting any activity on Czechoslovakia’s borders that 
might be interpreted by the Soviet’s as support for Dubcek’s regime. This state of affairs 
likely helped strengthen the case for the interventionist coalition. Dubcek’s inexperience 
in foreign affairs was also key in the Soviet invasion, Dubcek did not expect to deal with 
an intervention and was highly unprepared to do so. Ultimately it was a mixture of 
Dubcek’s inexperience and Brezhnev’s desire to be on the winning side, Brezhnev could 
not afford to be seen as a weakling especially when it came to revisionism and 
anticommunism (Valenta).  
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The decision to invade Czechoslovakia was also the result of an atmosphere of 
fear and insecurity that had been increasingly evident in both the foreign and domestic 
policy of the Soviet Union over the three or four years previous to the occupation. 
Domestically Brezhnev’s rule had been characterized by a revival of repressive measures 
against dissident intellectuals, mainly writers. Many writers at that time were 
condemning the action of not only Stalin but also the past actions of men who were now 
involved in ruling the country. Meanwhile, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was 
plagued by an irrational fear of increasing West German economic and political 
influence. The Soviets pressured many governments in order to prevent them from 
establishing official diplomatic relations with West Germany. 1968 was a year that 
showcased the Soviet Union’s fear for its continued dominance in the Soviet Union and 
fear for the maintenance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe (Czerwinski). 
The Soviet Union perceived there was danger in decreased Czechoslovak 
dependence especially because some Western countries were beginning to show an 
interest in financing some of the reforms proposed by Dubcek. The Soviet leaders 
decided that the reforms and reorientation of Czechoslovakia would be probable to affect 
the rest of Eastern Europe and even affect the Soviet Union itself. Brezhnev most 
certainly weighed the pros and cons of the invasion but ultimately decided that the 
concern for domestic control and maintenance of the East European empire won out.  
From the death of Stalin until 1968 Soviet policy in Eastern Europe had been 
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characterized by an attempt at maintaining a dominant position without the use of terror 
or military (Czerwinski). 
The Invasion 
 August 20, 1968 was a typical day at Ruzyne airport in Prague and by ten thirty at 
night only one flight out to Ankara remained on schedule for after midnight. Before that 
flight took off an Aeroflot plane arrived and a group of men got off and proceeded to 
their waiting cars. There was nothing out of the ordinary with this particular flight, 
however the events that transpired afterwards are truly transfixing. All of a sudden the 
men that had been sitting in the airport terminal apparently waiting for the flight to 
Ankara, stood up and took revolvers out of their pockets. The armed group proceeded to 
hold the airport’s air traffic controllers at gunpoint. Suddenly airplanes began to arrive at 
the Ruzyne airport, one after the other, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had begun 
(Chapman). 
On August 21, at around one in the morning came an announcement from Prague 
Radio alerting the residents of Czechoslovakia to remain calm and to not put up 
resistance to the Soviet troops.  By the time people were getting ready to go about their 
day, invading troops were already strategically placed throughout the streets. Although 
the Soviets probably expected some mild resistance from the Czechoslovaks, they 
thought that for the most part it would be an easy takeover. However, soon the invaders 
were stunned, when instead of being greeted with smiles, they were booed and spat at. 
Many of the invading forces had not taken much, in terms of supplies, expecting that 
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food, water, and other facilities would be provided for them, but seemingly everywhere, 
they were refused. The invasion meant the end of the seven months of freedom that 
Czechoslovakia had felt under Dubcek’s government and soon Czechoslovakia would be 
thrust back into Soviet repression (Chapman). 
 Previously, when Novotny had figured out that he was losing control over his 
country, he reacted predictably by calling in help from the Kremlin. Brezhnev’s visit did 
not accomplish much in favor of Novotny’s government on the contrary it helped weaken 
it, especially because Dubcek had already invited Brezhnev, secretly. A naked struggle 
for power ensued and Dubcek replaced Novotny by unanimous vote. Within a short time 
the new leadership was rallying popular support by implementing such things as: 
abolishing literary and press censorship and the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist 
terror trials, travel restrictions were also lifted. By April of 1968 it was becoming clear 
that freedom of the press was on Dubcek’s shortlist, there were plans for much fairer 
elections and there was to be more trade with West Germany; Moscow’s worst fears were 
confirmed. At first Moscow did not deem an intervention necessary, but contrary to 
Moscow’s expectations, the Russian threat of intervention stiffened the spirit of 
independence within Czechoslovakia. Meaning the Russians actually helped solidify 
Dubcek’s position as leader (Chapman). 
 When Dubcek was informed of the Soviet invasion, in the late hours of August 
20th, he was incredulous. Dubcek had just reached an agreement with the Soviet 
government days before and refused to believe that they were now attacking him. It was 
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not until Dubcek witnessed the death of a civilian from his window that he realized that 
the Soviet threat was real. Before Dubcek could even make a phone call to the Soviet 
ambassador, his office was taken over, the phone cord was ripped from the wall and 
Dubcek along with two others were held at gunpoint. Dubcek was promptly arrested and 
led away by the aggressors who were most likely KGB agents. He was then tied up and 
placed in a car. The original plan had been to hold him until the new pro-Soviet 
government took office and then execute him, but things did not go as planned 
(Chapman). 
 The Czechoslovak army was meager in size compared to the invading forces, a 
mere 170,000 men formed the whole of the Czechoslovak army, and meanwhile the 
Soviet Union sent 175,000 men into Czechoslovakia. It is within this context that we can 
appreciate the true valor and resilience of the Czechoslovak people against such 
insurmountable odds. The resistance of the Czechoslovak people took many forms, 
ranging from spontaneous stone throwing and taunting of Russian tanks to the cunning 
clandestine radio stations that still aired and the defiance of the Czechoslovak leaders. 
Alone, each of these actions may have been completely ineffective but the people drew 
strength from each other and the different manifestations.  While the Czechoslovak 
people were resisting with defiance, their fallen leaders were still very much with them in 
their plight. Dubcek was under arrest and incommun 
icated but President Svoboda managed to get a defiant message broadcast to the 
Czechoslovak people. In his message, President Svoboda reassured his countrymen that 
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there was no question of turning back; the country must remain united. The Czechoslovak 
army leaders then also spoke out to affirm that they would only take orders from 
President Svoboda. These statements represented an essential bond between leader and 
people. Outside of Czechoslovakia the condemnation of Soviet action was at an all time 
high, predictably criticism from Western governments poured in and fellow communist 
countries such as: East Germany, Yugoslavia, Rumania and China also showed their 
disapproval but what came as the biggest surprise to the Kremlin was the fierce 
opposition of communist parties in Western countries such as: Italy and France 
(Chapman).  
 Despite the many pleas of caution from Czechoslovak leaders the violent 
outbursts against the invading forces continued and it was the youth that was leading the 
resistance. Crowds of young Czechoslovaks would gather every night outside the Prague 
Radio building and from there throw Molotov cocktails and flaming rags at the invaders’ 
trucks and tanks, sometimes they would succeed with setting them on fire. Youths 
proudly waving Czechoslovak flags would scrawl black swastikas wherever they could. 
Anything and everything was tossed at the invaders, everything from pieces of furniture 
to car parts, the people of Czechoslovakia, especially the youths were determined to 







 One of the most marked differences between the events in Mexico and Prague in 
1968 was the media. For the first time global events were being filmed and transmitted 
across the world. What is most interesting is that this aspect of the resistance movements 
was improvised. In Czechoslovakia the Russians found it hard to keep up with the 
different television and radio studios that were scattered about Prague. It became comical 
how the Russians with their archaic measures, such as wire cutting thought that that 
would solve their media problems, however many times the wrong wires were cut 
resulting in no cut in transmission. The agile Czechoslovaks meanwhile moved from one 
building to another, factories became the main stance of the clandestine media movement 
because Soviet forces had been told to not occupy factories under any circumstances in 
order not to antagonize any of the “friendly” workers. The clandestine media presence 
came to a halt after the Moscow Agreement, but it was a much-needed respite and 
unifying force for the Czechoslovak people (Chapman).  Meanwhile media coverage of 
the events at Tlatelolco was minimum, with the Olympics looming the Mexican 
government made it a point to exclude it as much as possible from its state run media 
channels, which were the ones most viewed by the Mexican people.  
Aftermath 
 We can only speculate as to what would have occurred had Dubcek been able to 
stay in power. Dubcek had tried to satisfy the people with a small taste of democracy but 
the people kept wanting more and more. Demands were being heard for opposition 
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political parties something unheard of in the Soviet sphere and something that Dubcek 
knew Brezhnev would never go for. Dubcek did denounce past abuses of power by the 
Communist Party and stated that the aim of the government was socialism, a branch of 
socialism in which personal and political beliefs could not be subject to secret police 
investigation. Clearly, Moscow was not pleased with Dubcek and his plans (Kurlansky). 
 As the invading forces began to settle in they were counting on having at least one 
steadfast ally in Czechoslovakia’s President Svoboda. As previously stated Svoboda was 
a soldier and after having fought for the Soviets it was expected that he would show 
unconditional support towards the Soviet Union at all times. However, when a pro-Soviet 
group visited the president in his residence, where he was being held under armed Soviet 
guard, Svoboda’s behavior can best be described as despondent. When asked to sign a 
document that endorsed the Soviet presence, Svoboda shouted quite loud and clear, “get 
out.” While most Czechoslovaks formed a deep coalition in defense of their nation one 
important question stood out, where was the rest of the Western World? How deeply 
would the West condemn Soviet action and more importantly would they be willing to 
take up arms in defense of Czechoslovakia? (Kurlansky).  
 The reaction from Washington came, to say the least, mildly. The President at that 
time was Lyndon Johnson, who was informed of the invasion and promptly called a 
meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The limited reaction by the US 
stems from the belief that the Soviet Union did not do such things anymore and Johnson 
was unwilling to take any deep measures from fear of destabilizing the newfound 
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peaceful coexistence between the US and the Soviet Union. Johnson instead opted to 
produce a strong denunciation within the United Nations. The UN did in fact condemn 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia but the Soviet Union simply used their veto power to 
override the condemnation (Kurlansky).  
Brezhnev had come to power in 1964 and by 1968 when the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia took place the years of stagnation were well under way. In his article 
Fedor Burlatsky seeks to clarify what exactly happened to the Soviet Union during 
Brezhnev’s eighteen-year rule. During Brezhnev’s tenure there was an obvious backtrack 
from the reforms established by Khrushchev’s thaw. The living standards of Soviet 
citizens were not getting better, while there seemed to be a return to old Stalinist 
administrative policies. Burlatsky deals with one specific aspect of stagnation, the notion 
of how in such a difficult period in the Soviet Union’s history could such a weak leader 
take the helm? Unlike the previous Soviet leaders, Brezhnev did not struggle for power, 
his transition was smooth and seemed effortless. What helped Brezhnev not only come to 
power but also maintain it for so long was the people he surrounded himself with and 
how good he was at playing the part of tactful leader, without truly being one (Burlatsky).  
It is hard to believe that Dubcek’s time as leader of the Czechoslovak people 
would cap off at sixteen months, Dubcek would resign in April of 1969. August 1968 
was the halfway mark of Dubcek’s reign and it marked the turning point from the 
optimism and exuberance witnessed in the spring and summer to the harsh reality of 
ruling a country in disarray. Dubcek’s eighteen months in office marked the greatest 
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liberty experienced in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989. During the first few 
weeks and months of Soviet occupation the Czechoslovak people held out hope that 
Dubcek would triumph and that the foreign soldiers would peacefully depart. This belief 
provided powerful incentives for public self-restraint, which may have unintentionally 
facilitated the restoration of authoritarian rule. Czechoslovak citizens were told not to 
exercise the freedom that Dubcek’s liberalization had promised; this suspension was to be 
purely temporary and that is why most citizens complied (Williams). 
A week after the Soviets marched into Prague, Czechoslovakia’s leaders returned 
to the capital city and was greeted by an anxious yet triumphant public. The feeling of 
triumph would quickly turn to desperation when that same day, President Svoboda 
addressed the nation via radio and reported that not only would foreign troops remain in 
Czechoslovakia for some time but also that Czechoslovakia would work to fulfill the 
Cierna and Bratislava agreements (the contents of which were a mystery). Svoboda did 
pay homage to those that had died the previous week but purposely left out any 
condemnation of the invasion. Most Czechoslovaks took this to mean capitulation, a 
feeling of disappointment permeated throughout Czechoslovakia. Later that same 
afternoon, Dubcek took to the radio to address the people and offered them a deal. In 
return for the Czechoslovak peoples’ good behavior and cooperation, he and other leaders 
would prioritize the withdrawal of foreign troops and the basic reform course would be 
back on track. Dubcek declared that state sovereignty (or rather, the illusion of it which 
they had been living in) would be restored but only if citizens were willing to surrender 
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their civil and political rights for the time being. Dubcek’s voice was noticeably tired, 
helping to give a glimpse of the tough ordeal he had most likely been through the past 
week and his broken humility was effective and made the Czechoslovaks sympathize 
with him (Williams). 
As opposed to the onslaught of violence that occurred in Mexico on the night of 
October 2nd, the violence within Czechoslovakia was more spread out. After the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, Soviet units were roaming the streets, causing fatal accidents, 
harassing, detaining, and raping citizens, and interfering in the work of local government 
and the media. By September 9th the invading forces had killed 82 civilians, most deaths 
were caused by senseless violence; Soviet soldiers were often drunk and did not hesitate 
to fire their weapons at random. Meanwhile, public compliance in Czechoslovakia 
continued but was not unconditional and the citizens fully expected to be informed of all 
developments pertaining to the departure of the foreign soldiers and the restoration of 
Czechoslovak autonomy. Moscow, however, did not take the citizens’ wants into 
consideration and by September had already launched a propaganda campaign to boost 
the authority of Svoboda while undermining Dubcek (Williams). 
Brezhnev saw the situation in Czechoslovakia as bothersome and desperately 
wanted to “normalize” the situation. This meant that the achievements of socialism 
should be safeguarded; he had no interest in the removal of foreign troops from 
Czechoslovakia. According to Brezhnev the masses had to be oriented correctly, which 
meant that the people of Czechoslovakia needed to understand that the invasion of Soviet 
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forces was due to the activity of anti-socialist elements. He then revealed that the Soviet 
Politburo had concluded that Czechoslovakia’s ‘abnormal situation’ was being blamed on 
the invasion when in reality it was the Czechoslovaks who were at fault, in particular one 
Czechoslovak, Alexander Dubcek. Brezhnev stated that what was happening in 
Czechoslovakia was a psychosis which had developed around Dubcek’s personality, he 
added that he was all for each leader enjoying authority but he was against cults. 
Brezhnev saw the nationalist unrest in Czechoslovakia as an embarrassment (Williams).  
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in itself did not damage the support given to 
Dubcek’s leadership of the Party; on the contrary it actually increased its popularity 
enormously. In 1968 the great majority of Czechoslovaks were for socialism, but for a 
democratic and liberal system of socialism. Like the Mexican students, the 
Czechoslovaks rejected police brutality, censorship and a dictatorship by a one-party 
system. It seems that Mexicans and Czechoslovaks wanted the same thing, personal 
freedom. The socialist system the Czechoslovaks wanted was a system based on popular 
support, and the government was to fulfill, as closely as possible, the wishes and 
demands of the population. Dubcek’s proposed “socialism with a human face” promised 
a socialist government by the people, for the people and of the people, not a far cry from 
what Mexicans wanted. Above all the Czechoslovak people wanted a pluralistic system, 
with many political lines, no censorship and a communication media free to function 
vigorously as a political and social critic (Czerwinski).  
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In line with Dubcek the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was to be the leader 
only as long as it satisfied those that it led. There was to be free political competition 
among three or more socialist parties, the parties would be licensed as long as their 
programs agreed with “socialist principles”, this definition excluded the advocacy of 
return to private ownership. The majority of Czechoslovaks opposed the creation of a true 
Communist opposition party they favored instead a coalition. Unbeknownst to Brezhnev 
the Communist Party was heavily favored to win if such a free and democratic election 
had taken place in Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party would have remained in power 
but not with unchallenged political hegemony. It is important to understand that the 
Czechoslovaks were not against the socialism of Marx and Engels it was Leninist 
revisionism that they reviled. The Czechoslovaks wanted desperately to free themselves 
of the Russian system of despotism that Lenin had helped instill, a system that had little 
to do with the logic of social and economic development of true Marxist socialism 
(Czerwinski).  
Conclusion  
Since 1968 the presidents of Mexico have slowly allowed voices of discontent to 
be heard in public forums but the government remains strictly in control and democracy 
is not prevalent. The student movement of 1968 represents the unfolding of an inevitable 
historical process. The Mexican Revolution that began in 1910 was supposed to pave the 
way for a new form of government but by 1968 its failure was well established and 
Mexico’s pyramidal structure was crumbling. The massacre at Tlatelolco can now be 
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seen as predictable and inevitable. Mexico’s authoritarian regime had no other plausible 
way to react; violence was necessary to suppress the students. The students of Mexico 
were searching for a wholeness of their society; they were calling for a public dialogue. 
Public dialogue represented the search for connections among Mexican society and their 
leader. After the events of 1968 a new order emerged in Mexico, an order based on the 
tensions between state paternalism and civil society. These tensions are what a kept a 
public dialogue from happening between Diaz Ordaz and the students and these tensions 
are what keep a public dialogue from happening today (Braun). 
Before the massacres at Tlatelolco President Diaz Ordaz called on the students to 
appear before him so that they could engage in some sort of dialogue, the students 
however, wanted a public and multitudinous dialogue with the state. The students’ 
version of public dialogue troubled Diaz Ordaz, he sensed that he would be engulfed by it 
and therefore no meeting was held. Prior to 1968 political violence in Mexico was not 
unknown, members of the Communist Party, Trotskyists, followers of Fidel Castro and 
other leftist groups were known for disrupting traffic, building barricades and protesting 
in front of the American Embassy. But the violence of 1968 was different, the student 
movement gained traction after police forces had pounced with unprecedented force on 
routine marches. The students were especially shaken up after the police and military 
took over various high schools attached to the National Autonomous University, the 
nation’s major public university. In July 1968 the military demolished a wooden ornate 
door of High School number 1 in Mexico City’s historic downtown district. After a few 
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days of battle, three students were left dead, hundreds injured and hundreds jailed; the 
violence of the state was worse than it had been since the Revolution. The emerging 
student movement had participants from a wide range of backgrounds causing a rift 
between seasoned militants and students who were first time protesters. Few of the first 
time protestors came with well-formed ideas about politics, for them it was just a protest 
against arbitrary government actions. With such a large mass of protestors, 
disorganization reigned supreme, many wondered if the president knew the full extent of 
the massacre without really knowing themselves what had occurred that October night. 
Few could believe that anyone in the government would be capable to order the slaughter 
of young Mexicans on their own streets (Braun).  
As the students protested, there was one issue that was inherent, noticeable but 
never claimed and that was the fact that the students saw themselves as superior to the 
pueblo. This feeling of superiority resulted in aggressive and vulgar public language, the 
protestors referred to their ruler as a cuckold, insulting his masculinity because if a 
Mexican man cannot control his own wife, how can he possible lead a country? This new 
wave of protestors marked a vital turning point in the student movement. After such 
jeering and taunting the state ceased all efforts to establish contact with the students. The 
students’ definition of “public dialogue” had become vague and the government informed 
the students that the sort of dialogue they were seeking had no legal precedence, even the 
press noted the impossibility of such a dialogue. The vagueness and informality of the 
students’ pleas resulted in many believing that the public dialogue was merely a ploy to 
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keep the movement going and cause more unrest, culminating in a socialist revolution 
(Braun).   
President Diaz Ordaz was troubled, the movement was beyond his comprehension 
and his most logical conclusion was conspiracy. The public dialogue sought by the 
students was one of the craziest ideas Diaz Ordaz had ever heard and he was sure no 
modern government in the world would agree to such a thing. The students wanted Diaz 
Ordaz and his government to take full responsibility for the assassinations that took place 
on October 2nd and they demanded that the government publicly accept its crimes as well 
as indemnify the fallen students. The students also wanted to meet personally with Diaz 
Ordaz in order to prove that they were moral, disinterested members of society who had 
not been influenced by any outside forces, including communism, to bring harm to 
Mexico. By the eve of the massacre at Tlatelolco there was a feeling of rejection 
emanating from both factions, both the students and the government were angry. Both the 
students and Diaz Ordaz had wanted to restore the relationship between them, they had 
wanted to come together and make Mexican society whole again, but they each 
misunderstood the other and the rift that was created continues in some ways, to this day 
(Braun).  
The Soviets believed that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would prevent change 
but they inadvertently set in motion a different kind of change, a change that would 
eventually lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Soviets invaded because they 
were not prepared to lose Czechoslovakia from their sphere of influence under any 
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circumstances. The loss of Czechoslovakia would have upset the balance of power on 
which European security had relied on since the end of World War II. It is important to 
mention that Brezhnev was very confident that his invasion of Czechoslovakia would not 
be met by US intervention. Brezhnev had received assurance from President Johnson that 
the US would not intervene, Brezhnev was also aware of a meeting between Henry 
Kissinger and Czech foreign minister Jiri Hajek. In said meeting Kissinger confirmed that 
the division of balance that existed was advantageous to both sides, it would create great 
conflict and dire consequences to alter the existing balance. (Davy) 
The suppression of the movements in Mexico and Czechoslovakia was merely a 
short-term solution. In Czechoslovakia the invasion transformed popular feeling, prior to 
the invasion people were mostly supportive of the leadership and remaining in the 
Warsaw pact. After the events of 1968 hatred for the Soviets was so intense that 
Czechoslovakia could no longer be considered Moscow’s steadfast ally. The invasion 
helped cement the eventual downfall of the Iron Curtain, unbeknownst to them. The 
invasion of Czechoslovakia revealed to the world how the Soviet Union had become little 
more than an incarnation of old imperialist Russia. The altered perception of the Soviet 
Union caused it many losses of allies and brought about a high skepticism of true Soviet 
intentions (Davy). 
The 1960’s were a tumultuous time in the world and communism was at an all 
time high in popularity. The invasion of Czechoslovakia impacted communist 
movements around the world. The Prague Spring had given left-wing parties hope that 
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communism had finally found a way towards the realization of libertarian ideals, but the 
Soviets promptly crushed these hopes and simultaneously deprived themselves of the 
loyalty of many communists. This gave rise to attempts at extracting concessions from 
regimes instead of a reactivation of the idealist remnants that once inspired them. Soviet 
leaders did not foresee what the full extent of the loss of ideological authority would be. 
One of the Soviet leadership’s worst mistakes was its lack of interest in the evolution of 
socialism for their own political gain especially since after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia the potential alliance of Western communists was lost. The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia caused a disagreement between the East and the West over the meaning 
of détente, the invasion made both cultural and political freedom seem harder to achieve. 
If the Soviet Union had to use tanks to impose its will on a friendly and dependent 
country even after controlling the statewide media for twenty years, it was a clear sign of 
failure for the Soviet Union and its policies within its sphere of influence. It is plausible 
to conclude that the invasion of Czechoslovakia began the Soviet Union’s downward 
spiral, which eventually concluded with the dissolution of it in 1991. Dubcek’s reforms 
offered a chance at democratic change within the communist framework; maybe his plans 
would not have fulfilled everyone’s expectations but his fight for freedom remains 
admired to this day (Davy).  
As students, the Mexicans and the Czechoslovaks saw themselves as distinct from 
workers and peasants, they felt greater obligation to serve their nations (Braun). After 
each country’s ordeal there was silence. In Mexico, President Diaz Ordaz would never 
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regain the full support of his followers and few were able to forgive him for shedding the 
blood of Mexico’s youth. In Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek’s rule was winding 
down and with him the hopes of many but the disillusionment would turn to resolution 
and within twenty years the Velvet Revolution would grant both the Czechs and the 
Slovaks their freedom.  
In both Mexico and Czechoslovakia the protestors in 1968 had not challenged the 
right of the government to govern, on the contrary they had appealed for their 
governments to govern more. In both countries the old order emerged in a renewed state 
and it would take two decades for protestors to rise again and demand more from their 
governments. On Christmas day 1991 the Soviet flag, adorned with the hammer and 
sickle, which had become so intrinsically tied to communism, was lowered over the 
Kremlin for the last time. The Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Prior to Gorbachev’s 
resignation as President of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of the Russian 
Federation, Czechoslovakia had already been through its Velvet Revolution in 1988. In 
1988 the students of Czechoslovakia once again took to the streets in protest of the one 
party Communist government. The culmination of the Velvet Revolution was 
Czechoslovakia’s first democratic election since 1946. 1988 was also an important year 
in Mexico, it was a year of presidential elections and the PRI had been losing popularity 
ever since the disastrous events of 1968. The presidential election of 1988 was centered 
on the issue of political legitimacy that had been popularized in 1968 (Rohter). The PRI’s 
candidate was forty-year-old Carlos Salinas, who had been a student during the 1968 
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movement. Salinas’ main opposition came from Cuauhtémoc Cardenas who represented 
the left wing PRD party. Salinas was named the victor but over the years there has been a 
widespread reassurance of the election being fraudulent, even former Mexican President 
Miguel de la Madrid admitted in his autobiography that the election had been rigged in 
order to secure a win for the PRI party. 
Czechoslovakia is now known as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, two separate 
countries that have both been a part of the European Union since 2004 and have 
experienced consistent economic development while maintaining their status as a full 
democracies (Kekic). The Czech Republic has risen as one of the top performers from the 
former communist bloc. Meanwhile the PRI was finally defeated in the 2000 elections 
with Vicente Fox of the PAN party winning the presidential election however Mexico has 
continued to struggle with a flawed political system causing many to believe that true 
democracy will never be achieved.  
This study is important because we explore and highlight the emergence of 
parallel movements in seemingly disconnected countries. However, well-educated 
students look for ideals and improving society in similar times, while the state seeks to 
repress and maintain the status quo. This is still relevant today as youth movements in 
multiple countries led to the now known Arab Spring have upended some regimes; or the 
emergence of multiple new civil rights movements in the US against local governments 
that have caused furor in the political debate. Understanding how these movements arise 
and what makes them legitimate may help address issues effectively in a constructive 
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fashion. For a regime to survive it must maintain its legitimacy to the population. 
Therefore, they must accommodate legitimate concerns from the social movements of the 
day. Eventually, regimes that are not legitimate will crumble; but lives will be lost in the 
struggle. 
Although 1968 was a tumultuous year around the world and many student protests 
occurred, the similarities between Mexico and Czechoslovakia continued to resonate for 
years to come. In 1968 Mexico and Czechoslovakia were two countries trying to come 
into their own, their student populations, especially, were looking for a voice. The 
protests in Mexico and Czechoslovakia differed from others in that the protesters were 
actively seeking for a regime change into democracy. Even though the protests in both 
Mexico and Czechoslovakia were squashed within days and people, for the most part, 
retreated from publicly protesting, the silent majority was there, stirring and waiting for 
the moment to strike again. For both countries that moment came in the late 1980’s, for 
the first time since the beginning of the PRI’s regime, Mexicans rallied around a 
candidate from a different party and had realistic hope of achieving victory in the 1988 
presidential election. Meanwhile in 1989, Czechoslovakia was swept up in the Velvet 
Revolution, people were beginning to openly express their discontent with their country’s 
living standards and advocating for economic reform. With Mikhail Gorbachev in power 
in the Soviet Union, his glasnost and perestroika reforms helped give the people of 
Czechoslovakia hope for a reformation of their political order and for restructuring their 
economic system.  
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The presidential election of 1988 in Mexico City was won by the PRI party, but it 
was speculated that the results were rigged. Speculation turned to veracity when, years 
later, ex President Miguel de la Madrid attested to the fact that the election had been 
rigged and all ballots were burned to remove any evidence. Czechoslovakia achieved 
victory after the Velvet Revolution with the election of Vaclav Havel as President and the 
subsequent end of the communist regime. In 1992 Czechoslovakia was officially 
dissolved in favor of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and both remain democracies to 
this day. The 1980’s were make it or break it for Mexico and Czechoslovakia, if political 
change was going to occur it was a prime moment, the world was changing and they 
sought to change with it. Communist led countries were toppling and economic 
liberalization was affecting the manufacturing industry causing countries like Mexico to 
experience economic growth. Czechoslovakia made it in the 1980’s while Mexico 
frustratingly continues its search of democracy today. 
Czechoslovakia and Mexico in 1968 were countries separated by distance, 
language and culture, among other things, but they were united by the ideology and 
principles of many of their citizens, making them prime candidates for comparison. 
Although Mexico, the Czech Republic and Slovakia vastly differ today, they will always 
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